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Neuroscience and the Free Exercise of Religion 
 
Steven Goldberg 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Dr. Michael Persinger, a prominent neuroscientist and author, can 
stimulate your right temporal lobe and quite possibly cause you to 
experience a sense that something God-like is in the room.1 Persinger draws 
no small conclusions from this. “What is the last illusion that we must 
overcome as a species?,” he asks.  And he answers: “That illusion is that 
God is an absolute that exists independent of the human brain – that 
somehow we are in his or her care.”2  
 
 Professor Michael Gazzaniga, head of a leading academic Center for 
the Study of the Mind, relies on studies showing that specific parts of the 
brain are activated when people make moral judgments to conclude that 
religious teachings must give way to what he calls a “universal ethics.”3 “It 
is not a good idea to kill,” according to Gazzaniga, “because it is not a good 
idea to kill, not because God or Allah or Buddha said it was not a good idea 
to kill.”4  
 
 Other scholars and commentators have supported variations on  these 
themes, concluding, for example, that modern neuroscience undermines 
belief in a monotheistic God or in the Bible.5 Still others maintain that brain 
imaging studies fit perfectly with support for “militant atheism.”6 
 
                                           
 James and Catherine Denny Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC. I 
would like to thank Miriam Goldberg, Louis Michael Seidman, and Girardeau Spann for their comments 
and suggestions.  
1 Professor Michael A. Persinger, the author of Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs (Santa Barbara, 
California, 1987), discussed this aspect of his work on National Public Radio on 19 May, 2009. See 
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104291534> (accessed 16 July 2009).  
2  ibid.  
3  Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain (New York, 2005) 163-178. 
4  ibid 165. 
5  Bennett Gordon, ‘Neuroscience Could Be Killing God’ (June 4, 2008) Utne Reader 
<http://www.utne.com/2008-06-04/SpiritualityNeuroscience-Could-Be-Killing-God.aspx> (accessed 16 
July 2009). 
6  Kelly Bulkeley, ‘The Cognitive Revolution and the Decline of Monotheism’ (May 30, 2008), The 
Immanent Frame <http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/2008/05/30/the-cognitive-revolution-and -
the-decline-0f-monotheism/> (accessed 16 July 2009).    
 If these beliefs take hold in popular culture, they could, over time, 
have substantial implications for the legal status of religion. If you look 
across the United States and Europe you will see variation in how free 
exercise of religion claims are handled, yet you will nonetheless see a broad 
consensus that religious practices should be respected and tolerated unless 
they disrupt public order.7 But that consensus might erode if religion came 
to be seen as simply a byproduct of biology and not a very attractive 
byproduct at that. And, needless to say, the establishments of religion tha
linger in some European countries
t 
viving a 
                                          
8 would also have difficulty sur
transformed view of religion as a branch of neurology. 
 
 Neuroscience will not, however, fundamentally undermine the social 
and legal status of religion. We know this is so for two reasons. First, those 
who believe brain science erases supernatural religion have logical and 
philosophical hurdles they have not begun to surmount. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the challenges that are being raised today have been with us for 
over one hundred years and have had little to no impact. 
 
II. Neuroscience, Metaphysics, and Ethics 
 
 As to the first point, there simply is a lot more intellectual work to be 
done to make the case that neuroscience decisively undermines religious 
belief. Persinger’s apparent belief that empirical testing can falsify 
supernatural claims is baffling. Karl Popper himself made clear that science 
simply cannot speak to the truth of metaphysics. That is the whole point of 
saying that scientific claims must be falsifiable. Progress in science has 
come from the recognition that the statement “God exists” is not scientific 
because it is not testable. Thus alleged scientific proofs of God’s existence 
are, in fact, undermined by the modern approach to science. But that is 
completely different from saying that “God exists” is false. Science cannot 
tell us that.9 
 
7  See eg  J. Tomasso, ‘Separation of the Conjoined Twins: A Comparative Analysis of the Rights to 
Privacy and Religious Freedom in Great Britain and the United States’ (2002) 54 Rutgers Law Review 771. 
8  See eg C. Evans and C. Thomas, ‘Church-State Relations in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2006) 2006 Brigham Young University Law Review 699. 
9  For an account of Popper’s thinking on metaphysics, see eg Stephen Mumford, ‘Metaphysics’ in (eds.) 
Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (London, 2008), 26-
35. Mumford makes clear that Popper’s views are disputed by many philosophers, but it remains true that 
Popper has the “largest methodological influence on actual scientists” in modern times.  S. O’Connor, ‘The 
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science: Will the Real Karl Popper Please Stand Up?’ (1995) 35 
Jurimetrics Journal 276. For further support for the proposition that “neuroscience ultimately cannot 
disprove a metaphysical soul,” see Paul Root Wolpe, ‘Religious Responses to Neuroscientific Questions’ in 
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 As Popper himself put it, falsifiability is: 
 
 A criterion of demarcation between empirical science on the one hand 
and pure mathematics, logic, metaphysics, and pseudo-science on the 
other…. The broad line of demarcation between empirical science … 
and … metaphysics … has to be drawn right through the very heart of 
the region of sense – with meaningful theories on both sides of the 
dividing line – rather than between the region of sense and nonsense.10 
 
 But does Persinger level at least a practical attack on religion? Here, 
too, his position is wanting. Suppose stimulation of the brain by a clinician 
triggers a religious experience. That might undermine the faith of someone 
who thought only God could trigger such an experience. But many people of 
faith would have no difficulty in accepting that God can also do what a 
clinician can do. After all, neuroscientific studies have shown that placebos 
operate on the pathways of pain in much the same way as opiates.11 If a 
placebo can trigger the brain, it would be odd to suppose God could not. 
And of course for many it is God who made sure in the first place that 
people have brains that can experience the spiritual. 
 
 It is also hard to give great weight to Gazzaniga’s notion that our 
knowledge of the brain will lead to a universal ethics which will supplant 
traditional religions. First there is his apparent commission of the naturalistic 
fallacy. He seems to assume that what is tells us what ought to be. But any 
serious study of the brain, just like any serious study of the Bible, would turn 
up substantial evidence that some people are predisposed to enslave others.12 
Yet that does not make slavery morally acceptable. 
 
 Even when brain science allegedly uncovers a helpful moral teaching, 
Gazzaniga’s hope for a universal ethics is not very promising. He finds that, 
in certain settings, people believe that we should not kill. But a cursory 
                                                                                                                             
(ed.) Judy Illes, Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice, and Policy (Oxford, 2006), 289, 292-
293.  
10  Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science ( London, 1992) 175-176 (emphasis in the original).  
11  A. J. Kolber, ‘A Limited Defense of Clinical Placebo Deception’ (2007) 26 Yale Law & Policy Review 
89-90. 
12  The acceptance of slavery in the Old and New Testament and in other religious texts along with the 
persistence of slavery in modern times are among the topics discussed in B.K. Freemon, ‘Slavery, 
Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence’ (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 1.  
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glance around the globe suggests that we do, as a species, differ quite a bit 
on issues like pacifism and capital punishment. In a world in which abortion 
ranges from a crime to a constitutional right, we may have to put the 
emergence of a universal ethics based on science on hold for a little while. 
 
 
III. William James and the Lessons of History 
 
 Yet the biggest problem with the neuroscientific attack on religion is 
that we have been through this before, and religion has emerged essentially 
unscathed. By the early days of the twentieth century, medicine and science 
had progressed to the point where the ecstatic experiences of great religious 
leaders were often attributed to physical abnormalities: Saint Paul was 
viewed as an epileptic, Saint Teresa as an hysteric, and so on.13  
 
 It was against this backdrop that William James delivered the Gifford 
Lectures on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh. James’ talks, 
published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience, took as their 
subject precisely the subjective experiences of those religious visionaries 
who often fell into trances, heard voices, saw visions, and the like.14 James 
had no interest in the “ordinary religious believer who follows the 
conventional observances” of Christianity or any other faith.15 He said that it 
“would profit us little to study this second-hand religious life” marked as it 
was by “fixed forms of imitation and retained by habit.”16 James was 
interested precisely in people like Saint Paul. 
 
 As a philosopher and a psychologist who also had a medical degree, 
James was well situated to address religion and the mind. And, indeed, he 
began his talk by arguing that to “plead the organic causation of a religious 
state of mind … in refutation of its claim to possess superior spiritual value 
is quite illogical and arbitrary….”17 We cannot improve upon the reason he 
gave: 
                                           
13  William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York 2008 
edition) 16. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid 10. 
16 ibid. 
17  ibid  17. James concludes this sentence by saying, “unless one has already worked out in advance some 
psycho-physical theory connecting spiritual values in general with determinate sorts of physiological 
change.” ibid. James here is rejecting the idea that an experience produced by a certain part of the brain is 
morally superior because that part of the brain is somehow privileged. He writes that “medical materialism 
… has no physiological theory of the production of  … its favorite states, by which it may accredit them; 
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 [T]here is not a single one of our states of mind, high or low, healthy 
or morbid, that has not some organic process as its condition. 
Scientific theories are organically conditioned just as much as 
religious emotions are; and if we only knew the facts intimately 
enough, we should doubtless see “the liver” determining the dicta of 
the sturdy atheist as decisively as it does those of the Methodist….18 
 
 Today it is popular to give functional MRIs to see how the brain is 
behaving when religious or moral sentiments are under consideration. In the 
future it may be equally popular to scan the brains of scientists while they 
think about dark matter or superstring theory or neuroscience itself. The 
results may be fascinating, but they will tell us nothing about the merits of 
the topics on the thinkers’ minds. 
 
 Since William James, the subject of the connection between our 
physical selves and our religious beliefs has come up time and again. Just 
fifteen years ago, when the Human Genome Project, rather than brain 
scanning, was the reductionist theory of the day, the cover of Time 
Magazine announced the discovery of The God Gene and asked “Does our 
DNA compel us to seek a higher power?”19  
 
 The God Gene turned out to be hard to pin down. But the bigger point 
is that it scared very few people of faith. Just as with the results of MRIs, a 
gene for religion that is seen by some as an evolutionary adaptation that 
undermines God is taken by others as evidence that God himself has hard 
wired us for faith.20  
 
 Indeed in recent years, religious organizations, far from being cowed 
by developments in brain science, have sponsored conferences that have 
featured presentations on the compatibility of neuroscience and faith. At the 
Woodstock Theological Center, Dr. Malcolm Jeeves argued that “all the 
evidence in neuroscience points to us as a … unity….[T]here are these 
intimate relations between mental life, emotional life and neural structures, 
                                                                                                                             
and its attempt to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with nerves and liver, 
and connecting them with names connoting bodily affliction, is altogether illogical and inconsistent.” ibid.     
18 ibid. 
19  ‘The God Gene: Does our DNA Compel Us to Seek a Higher Power? Believe It or Not, Some Scientists 
Say Yes’ Time (October 25, 2004)(Cover). 
20  See eg Dean Hamer, The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into our Genes (New York , 2004). 
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including the spiritual dimension.”21 By the spiritual dimension, Jeeves said, 
“I mean essentially a relationship with God however you formulate that.”22  
At the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences’ conference on 
Neuroscience, Religious Experience and the Self, Professor David Ray 
Griffin concluded that “the existence and persistence of religion,” including 
“a direct experience … of a Holy Actuality” is consistent with the scientific 
point of view.23  
 
 It is reasonable to wonder why people of faith are comfortable with 
neuroscience while many remain deeply troubled by the theory of evolution. 
Neuroscience, after all, is completely embedded in and dependent on the 
evolutionary framework: working neuroscientists are not likely to be 
creationists. 
 
 While it is, of course, possible to reconcile evolution with belief in 
God, there is no denying that Darwin’s work caused a crisis in traditional 
religion.24 Why is neuroscience not doing the same?  
 
 The reason is that evolution is not simply a set of facts, or a model, or 
an increase in our knowledge about the material nature of human beings. 
Evolution is a narrative. It is a story about who we are and where we are 
going. From a human point of view, it is not a particularly uplifting 
narrative, indeed it is not even centered on humans. And evolution is a 
counter-narrative to that told by traditional religions. They tell a story in 
which we are specially created and have a special destiny. Giving up a 
central narrative that gives meaning to our existence is not easy. 
 
 Consider the argument put forward by Ron Carlson and Ed Decker in 
their book, Fast Facts on False Teachings, in which they defend evangelical 
Christianity and attack evolution. Carlson and Decker write that according to 
evolution, “You are the descendant of a tiny cell of primordial protoplasm 
washed up on an ocean beach 3 ½ billion years ago….You are a mere grab-
bag of atomic particles, a conglomeration of genetic substance…. [Y]ou 
came from nothing, you are going nowhere.”25 The Christian view, in 
                                           
21  Malcolm Jeeves, ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’ (1998) 1998 Woodstock Forum 19. 
22  ibid. 
23  David Ray Griffin, ‘Scientific Naturalism, The Mind-Body Relation, and Religious Experience’ (2002) 
37 Zygon 376. 
24  See eg Steven Goldberg, Seduced By Science: How American Religion Has Lost Its Way (New York, 
1999) 25-39. 
25  Ron Carlson and Ed Decker, Fast Facts on False Teachings (Eugene, Oregon, 1994) 62. 
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contrast, says, “You are the special creation of a good and all-powerful God. 
You are the climax of His creation…. [Y]]ou are unique…. Your Creator 
love[s] you.”26 
 
 Unlike evolution, neuroscience can be seen as simply providing a 
deeper understanding of the wonderfully complex special brain that God has 
given us. And those neuroscientists who think that the discipline’s 
deterministic framework is somehow inconsistent with religion need to meet 
some Calvinists.  
 
 
IV. Incremental Legal Change As Law Reacts to Neuroscience 
 
 
 So neuroscience will not fatally undermine religion or fundamentally 
erode its legal status. But that is only half of the story.  
 
 Recent research in brain science will play a role in the law in a 
manner that is typical of scientific advances. The role will be modest rather 
than grandiose, incremental rather than sweeping. Advocates for a party in a 
dispute will seek to use current research findings as part of their effort to 
advance their cause. If the courts judge the proffered evidence to be 
sufficiently reliable the evidence will be admitted. It may then play a part in 
the tribunal’s final decision. An individual litigated matter will not 
necessarily have broad implications, but over time the underlying science 
may become a feature of certain disputes. 
 
 Under this scenario, neuroscience could play a role in law and religion 
disputes in the courtroom, just as it can play a role in other legal settings. Let 
me give a hypothetical example to clarify my point before turning to a few 
actual cases that have already arisen. 
 
 Under current law in many American states, parents can be excused 
from their ordinary obligation to give their children traditional medical 
treatment when the parents object on religious grounds.27 Christian 
Scientists are the main beneficiaries of this religious exemption. This 
                                           
26  ibid 63. 
27  For a discussion, with references, of the material in this paragraph, see Kei Robert Hirasawa, ‘Are 
Parents Acting in the Best Interests of their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their 
Religious Beliefs?’ (2006) 44 Family Court Review 318. 
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statutory exemption, where it exists, is not unlimited. Parents, regardless of 
their religious beliefs, are never free to prevent their children from receiving 
life saving care. But when a treatment is related to health rather than life, 
and a parent chooses to use prayer rather than conventional medicine, that 
parent will be immune from child neglect charges in certain states. 
 
 As with all legal doctrines, hard cases can arise under these statutes. 
How dangerous is the child’s illness? Are the parents’ objections really 
based on religion, as required by the statute? These kinds of issues are 
determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 
 So consider the following hypothetical case. A single father has a 
young daughter with a serious arm injury. The doctor wants to intervene 
with antibiotics. The father, who is not affiliated with any organized 
religious group and has not been to church for years, suddenly announces 
that he will pray over his daughter rather than bring her back to the doctor’s 
office. He says that he is hearing voices from God telling him to keep his 
daughter at home.  
 
 When the matter comes before a judge, she is quite troubled. She is 
concerned that the child could have an infection that will become very 
serious. She knows that under the statutory exception for religious practice it 
should not matter whether the father is a member of an organized church, 
but she is concerned that his statements are better described as erratic or 
troubled rather than religious.  
 
 Suppose now that the state, in an effort to force treatment, introduces 
neuroscientific evidence that the father’s experience of hearing voices is 
typical of a particular brain abnormality usually viewed as a type of mental 
illness. Perhaps the state has even obtained brain scans of the father that 
support this view. 
 
 I believe it is quite plausible that this neuroscientific evidence could 
play a role in the judge deciding that treatment should be given to the 
daughter over the father’s objection. Technically, the judge might find that 
the father’s objections are not religious under the statute, although the 
decision could also involve a stated or unstated concern that the injury could 
be potentially life threatening. My point is simply that the neuroscience 
might matter to this judge. 
 
 8
 The immediate objection to this prediction is that it appears to flatly 
contradict our earlier observation that neuroscience will not undermine 
religion. What happened to the arguments we heard a moment ago? 
Attributing the voice of God that  the father is hearing to a particular part of 
his brain should not undermine that voice any more than attributing a 
doctor’s brilliant diagnosis to a part of the doctor’s brain should undermine 
the diagnosis. 
 
 The answer is that there is a contradiction, but it is one that we see in 
the law every day. Consider the insanity defense, which negates criminal 
liability if because of mental illness an individual cannot tell right from 
wrong.28 Why do we regard an individual as not guilty by reason of insanity 
if his moral compass has been thrown off by a mental defect, but not if it has 
been impaired by extreme poverty or drug addition? Surely it is the brain 
that is implicated in all of these cases.  
 
 Or consider the doctrine in some jurisdictions that excuses you from a 
contract if you entered into the deal under the compulsion of a mental 
disease.29 To a philosopher or a scientist any contract you made might be 
traced back to your genetic endowment, your upbringing, and the latest 
advertisements you saw, but that sort of compulsion argument will never 
work.  
 
 Obviously the courtroom plays fast and loose with deep philosophical 
ideas like determinism. The legal system’s treatment of these concepts is 
rarely logically consistent. Instead the law treats new scientific theories on a 
rather ad hoc basis until some sort of broad societal consensus arises. 
 
 There are two primary reasons judicial decision makers do not seek 
scientific and philosophical consistency above all else.30 First, in resolving a 
case, a judge is seeking a peaceful and socially acceptable resolution of a 
dispute. People need a chance to be heard, values like religious liberty and 
child welfare need to be weighed, public understanding needs to be 
considered. The accurate resolution of a factual dispute is not the only, or 
even the primary, goal.  
 
                                           
28  See eg M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H. L. 1843). 
29  See eg Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S. 2d 763 (Sup. Ct. NY 1963). 
30  I have discussed the material in this and the succeeding paragraph in Steven Goldberg, Culture Clash: 
Law and Science in America (New York, 1994) 13-20. 
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 Secondly, every judge understands that not to decide is a decision. If a 
judge said, “I won’t order a young child to receive treatment until there is 
complete consensus on the neuroscience underlying the voices the father is 
hearing, and full philosophical agreement on whether the father had a real 
choice in making his decision,” then no child would ever be treated over the 
parent’s objection. And if the judge put the burden on the parent to prove 
beyond any doubt his scientific and philosophical assumptions then religious 
liberty would never be respected. The law doesn’t have the luxury of 
waiting, so it moves along, case by case, making imperfect decisions in the 
best way it can. 
 
 It is not that there are no relevant legal presumptions here. Whether it 
be religious belief, criminal responsibility, or the making of contracts, the 
law, as Justice Cardozo put it, begins “with a robust common sense which 
assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis.”31 But, as Cardozo 
well knew, there are places where we put this assumption aside. 
 
V. Recent Cases 
 
 Although it did not involve religion, there has already been one major 
United States Supreme Court case where modern brain science played a role. 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court, in 2005, ruled that it violated the 
Constitution for the state of Missouri to execute individuals who were under 
the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed.32 In finding that the 
death penalty in those instances constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 
the Court relied in part on an amicus brief filed on behalf of scientists and 
doctors which argued that adolescent brain development is immature 
because the frontal lobe is not fully developed, and it is this part of the brain 
that is responsible for impulse control and good judgment.33  
 
 One can already hear the shouts of protests. When the frontal lobe is 
fully developed, does that mean that free will magically appears? And does 
this maturing of the lobe happily take place precisely when one turns 
eighteen? And so on. 
 
                                           
31  Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). 
32  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
33  ibid 569-570. See also A. Haider, ‘Roper v. Simmons: The Role of the Science Brief’ (2006) 3 Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law 369. 
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 But the Court knew all this and more. Its decision drew strength from 
the emerging field of neuroscience – and science does lend some prestige to 
a judicial ruling – but it relied as well on precedent, on the unwillingness to 
execute children in most American states and in most countries around the 
world, and on a broader discomfort with the death penalty itself.34 Even 
when the Court referenced the scientific studies, it did so in a cautious way, 
embedding them in common sense and legislative judgments: 
 
 [A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies 
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity 
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth 
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the 
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.” …. In recognition of the comparative 
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State 
prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or 
marrying without parental consent….35  
 
 So in the field of law and religion, I would expect neuroscience to 
make some limited but important appearances in the years ahead. There 
already are some cases of this type. In 2008, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed a decision by a district court civilly committing Allison Fischer to a 
mental institution and ordering the involuntary administration of neuroleptic 
medication by that institution.36  
 
 At the time of the case, Fischer was a homeless twenty-two year old 
with no income. She was asking strangers if she could live with them, was 
expressing grandiose ideas such as winning the World Cup, and was not 
sleeping regularly. A psychologist testified that she exhibited grossly 
disturbed behavior and faulty perception. Although Fischer insisted that she 
was not mentally ill, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court holding that she was a danger to self and others and could 
be committed and treated. 
 
                                           
34  See eg E.F. Emens, ‘Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination’ (2005) 2005 
Supreme Court Review 51. 
35  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
36  In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of Allison Fischer, State of Minnesota Court of Appeals, A07-
1531 (2008). 
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 What gives the case particular interest is that much of Fischer’s 
behaviors and perceptions involved religion. Her grandiose ideas included 
planning to convert China, Russia, and Africa to Catholicism, she refused to 
have blood drawn and to remove her clothes on religious grounds, and she 
was described by her mother as being religiously preoccupied. Moreover, 
the court did not rely solely on the psychologist presented by the 
government. The district court appointed a “certified neuropsychiatrist” who 
found among other things that Fischer “is in a manic phase of bipolar 
disorder” and that “[s]he does not have the ability to manipulate information 
rationally.”37 In the end both the district and appellate courts brushed aside 
Fischer’s explicit freedom of religion claims. 
 
 It is not clear from the record what tests this “certified 
neuropsychiatrist” used, and it is far from clear that the case would have 
come out differently if the neuropsychiatrist had not testified. But this is a 
typical example of using science to bolster a case that turns on other factors 
as well, and it is clear that neuroscience is available to play that role.  
 
 Another straw in the wind is the recent decision in Boone v. Missouri, 
in which an inmate resisted participating in a therapy program on the ground 
that “the Word of God only has the answers” to his problems and that “only 
the Lord Jesus Christ and His Holy Spirit can make any necessary changes 
in my life.”38 Failure to participate in the program lengthened the amount of 
time Boone had to spend incarcerated. The court’s rejection of Boone’s 
position turned on many factors, but it is worth noting that the Court quoted 
without disapproval the finding of a therapist that Boone’s religious 
convictions were evidence of “internalized distortions” in his mind.39       
 
 Fischer and Boone are not leading precedents, and they certainly do 
not mean that the medical profession is going to begin to view religion 
generally as an illness or that courts would have any patience with such an 
approach.40 But they do suggest that in close cases, emerging findings 
relating neuroscience to religion may find a role in some judicial contexts. 
                                           
37  ibid 3-4. 
38  Boone v. Missouri, 147 S.W. 801, 804 (Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District, 2004). 
39  ibid  805. 
40  With the narrow, controversial exception of the “deific decree” doctrine, courts and psychiatrists have 
long agreed that religious belief should not be viewed as an illness. See eg  C. Hawthorne, ‘”Deific 
Decree”: The Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine’ (2000) 33 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1755; 
G.H. Morris and A. Haroun, ‘”God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?’ (2001) 38 San Diego Law 
Review 973. 
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 Given the way the law necessarily works, there is one final paradox 
that is worth noting here. Consider the hypothetical case I gave concerning a 
father who suddenly hears the voice of God and therefore does not want to 
give his daughter traditional medical treatment. Among the factors that a 
court would consider in the real world is the fact that the father in my 
hypothetical was not a member of an organized religious group. If he were, 
by contrast, a life-long Christian Scientist who had come to his views, not 
because of sudden voices from above, but because of longstanding study of 
standard Christian Science texts, a court would be more reluctant to view his 
decision as evidence of mental illness and thus would be more likely to rule 
in his favor. And this is independent of whatever a brain scan of the father 
would show. The court would be quite understandably reacting to the fact 
that the religious exemption to child abuse statutes under consideration were 
largely supported by and largely aimed at protecting Christian Science and 
similar established groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses. The fact is that no 
court is going to medicalize and undermine the religious beliefs of millions 
of people. 
 
 The paradox becomes clear if we look at this from William James’ 
point of view. His defense of the authenticity of religious experience was 
aimed precisely at the ecstatic and extreme experiences of religious 
visionaries. He was quite uninterested in the “second-hand” religious life of 
ordinary parishioners. The law views the matter just the other way around, 
giving weight to the preferences of well established churches while tending 
to devalue the spiritual claims of unorthodox individuals. Odd perhaps, but 
an inevitable byproduct of a system in which science is just one input in a 
broad effort to resolve cases in a socially acceptable manner.  
 
  
